HCR_EL2, Hypervisor Configuration Register
The HCR_EL2 characteristics are:
Purpose
Provides configuration controls for virtualization, including defining whether various operations are trapped to EL2.
Configuration
AArch64 System register HCR_EL2 bits [31:0] are architecturally mapped to AArch32 System register HCR[31:0] .
AArch64 System register HCR_EL2 bits [63:32] are architecturally mapped to AArch32 System register HCR2[31:0] .
If EL2 is not implemented, this register is RES0 from EL3.
The bits in this register behave as if they are 0 for all purposes other than direct reads of the register if EL2 is not enabled in the current Security state.
Attributes
HCR_EL2 is a 64-bit register.
Field descriptions
The HCR_EL2 bit assignments are:
63 | 62 | 61 | 60 | 59 | 58 | 57 | 56 | 55 | 54 | 53 | 52 | 51 | 50 | 49 | 48 | 47 | 46 | 45 | 44 | 43 | 42 | 41 | 40 | 39 | 38 | 37 | 36 | 35 | 34 | 33 | 32 |
TWEDEL | TWEDEn | TID5 | DCT | ATA | TTLBOS | TTLBIS | EnSCXT | TOCU | AMVOFFEN | TICAB | TID4 | RES0 | FIEN | FWB | NV2 | AT | NV1 | NV | API | APK | RES0 | MIOCNCE | TEA | TERR | TLOR | E2H | ID | CD | |||
RW | TRVM | HCD | TDZ | TGE | TVM | TTLB | TPU | Bit[23] | TSW | TACR | TIDCP | TSC | TID3 | TID2 | TID1 | TID0 | TWE | TWI | DC | BSU | FB | VSE | VI | VF | AMO | IMO | FMO | PTW | SWIO | VM | |
31 | 30 | 29 | 28 | 27 | 26 | 25 | 24 | 23 | 22 | 21 | 20 | 19 | 18 | 17 | 16 | 15 | 14 | 13 | 12 | 11 | 10 | 9 | 8 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 |
TWEDEL, bits [63:60]
When FEAT_TWED is implemented:
When FEAT_TWED is implemented:
TWE Delay. A 4-bit unsigned number that, when HCR_EL2.TWEDEn is 1, encodes the minimum delay in taking a trap of WFE* caused by HCR_EL2.TWE as 2(TWEDEL + 8) cycles.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
Otherwise:
Otherwise:
Reserved, RES0.
TWEDEn, bit [59]
When FEAT_TWED is implemented:
When FEAT_TWED is implemented:
TWE Delay Enable. Enables a configurable delayed trap of the WFE* instruction caused by HCR_EL2.TWE.
TWEDEn | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
The delay for taking the trap is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED. |
0b1 |
The delay for taking the trap is at least the number of cycles defined in HCR_EL2.TWEDEL. |
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
Otherwise:
Otherwise:
Reserved, RES0.
TID5, bit [58]
When FEAT_MTE2 is implemented:
When FEAT_MTE2 is implemented:
Trap ID group 5. Traps the following register accesses to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state:
AArch64:
TID5 | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped. |
0b1 |
The specified EL1 and EL0 accesses to ID group 5 registers are trapped to EL2. |
When the value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, this field has an Effective value of 0 for all purposes other than a direct read of the value of this bit.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
Otherwise:
Otherwise:
Reserved, RES0.
DCT, bit [57]
When FEAT_MTE2 is implemented:
When FEAT_MTE2 is implemented:
Default Cacheability Tagging. When HCR_EL2.DC is in effect, controls whether stage 1 translations are treated as Tagged or Untagged.
DCT | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
Stage 1 translations are treated as Untagged. |
0b1 |
Stage 1 translations are treated as Tagged. |
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
Otherwise:
Otherwise:
Reserved, RES0.
ATA, bit [56]
When FEAT_MTE2 is implemented:
When FEAT_MTE2 is implemented:
Allocation Tag Access. When HCR_EL2.{E2H,TGE} != {1,1}, controls EL1 and EL0 access to Allocation Tags.
When access is prevented:
-
Instructions which Load or Store data are Unchecked.
-
Instructions which Load or Store Allocation Tags treat the Allocation Tag as RAZ/WI.
-
Instructions which insert Logical Address Tags into addresses treat the Allocation Tag used to generate the Logical Address Tag as 0.
-
Cache maintenance instructions which invalidate Allocation Tags from caches behave as the equivalent Clean and Invalidate operation on Allocation Tags.
-
MRS and MSR instructions at EL1 using GCR_EL1, RGSR_EL1, TFSR_EL1, TFSR_EL2, or TFSRE0_EL1 that are not UNDEFINED are trapped to EL2.
ATA | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
Access is prevented. |
0b1 |
Access is not prevented. |
This field is permitted to be cached in a TLB.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
Otherwise:
Otherwise:
Reserved, RES0.
TTLBOS, bit [55]
When FEAT_EVT is implemented:
When FEAT_EVT is implemented:
Trap TLB maintenance instructions that operate on the Outer Shareable domain. Traps execution of those TLB maintenance instructions at EL1 to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state. This applies to the following instructions:
TLBI VMALLE1OS, TLBI VAE1OS, TLBI ASIDE1OS,TLBI VAAE1OS, TLBI VALE1OS, TLBI VAALE1OS,TLBI RVAE1OS, TLBI RVAAE1OS,TLBI RVALE1OS, and TLBI RVAALE1OS.
TTLBOS | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped. |
0b1 |
Execution of the specified instructions are trapped to EL2. |
When FEAT_VHE is implemented, and the value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, this field behaves as 0 for all purposes other than a direct read of the value of this bit.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
Otherwise:
Otherwise:
Reserved, RES0.
TTLBIS, bit [54]
When FEAT_EVT is implemented:
When FEAT_EVT is implemented:
Trap TLB maintenance instructions that operate on the Inner Shareable domain. Traps execution of those TLB maintenance instructions at EL1 to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state. This applies to the following instructions:
- When EL1 is using AArch64, TLBI VMALLE1IS, TLBI VAE1IS, TLBI ASIDE1IS, TLBI VAAE1IS, TLBI VALE1IS, TLBI VAALE1IS, TLBI RVAE1IS, TLBI RVAAE1IS, TLBI RVALE1IS, and TLBI RVAALE1IS.
- When EL1 is using AArch32, TLBIALLIS, TLBIMVAIS, TLBIASIDIS, TLBIMVAAIS, TLBIMVALIS, and TLBIMVAALIS.
TTLBIS | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped. |
0b1 |
Execution of the specified instructions are trapped to EL2. |
When FEAT_VHE is implemented, and the value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, this field behaves as 0 for all purposes other than a direct read of the value of this bit.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
Otherwise:
Otherwise:
Reserved, RES0.
EnSCXT, bit [53]
When FEAT_CSV2 is implemented:
When FEAT_CSV2 is implemented:
Enable Access to the SCXTNUM_EL1 and SCXTNUM_EL0 registers. The defined values are:
EnSCXT | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 | When (HCR_EL2.TGE==0 or HCR_EL2.E2H==0) and EL2 is enabled in the current Security state, EL1 and EL0 access to SCXTNUM_EL0 and EL1 access to SCXTNUM_EL1 is disabled by this mechanism, causing an exception to EL2, and the values of these registers to be treated as 0. When ((HCR_EL2.TGE==1 and HCR_EL2.E2H==1) and EL2 is enabled in the current Security state, EL0 access to SCXTNUM_EL0 is disabled by this mechanism, causing an exception to EL2, and the value of this register to be treated as 0. |
0b1 |
This control does not cause accesses to SCXTNUM_EL0 or SCXTNUM_EL1 to be trapped. |
When FEAT_VHE is implemented, and the value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is {1,1}, this bit has no effect on execution at EL0.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
Otherwise:
Otherwise:
Reserved, RES0.
TOCU, bit [52]
When FEAT_EVT is implemented:
When FEAT_EVT is implemented:
Trap cache maintenance instructions that operate to the Point of Unification. Traps execution of those cache maintenance instructions to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state. This applies to the following instructions:
- When SCTLR_EL1.UCI is 1, HCR_EL2.{TGE, E2H} is not {1, 1}, and EL0 is using AArch64, IC IVAU, DC CVAU.
- When EL1 is using AArch64, IC IVAU, IC IALLU, DC CVAU.
- When EL1 is using AArch32, ICIMVAU, ICIALLU, DCCMVAU.
An exception generated because an instruction is UNDEFINED at EL0 is higher priority than this trap to EL2. In addition:
TOCU | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped. |
0b1 |
Execution of the specified instructions are trapped to EL2. |
If the Point of Unification is before any level of data cache, it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether the execution of any data or unified cache clean by VA to the Point of Unification instruction can be trapped when the value of this control is 1.
If the Point of Unification is before any level of instruction cache, it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether the execution of any instruction cache invalidate to the Point of Unification instruction can be trapped when the value of this control is 1.
When FEAT_VHE is implemented, and the value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, this field behaves as 0 for all purposes other than a direct read of the value of this bit.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
Otherwise:
Otherwise:
Reserved, RES0.
AMVOFFEN, bit [51]
When FEAT_AMUv1p1 is implemented:
When FEAT_AMUv1p1 is implemented:
Activity Monitors Virtual Offsets Enable.
AMVOFFEN | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
Virtualization of the Activity Monitors is disabled. Indirect reads of the virtual offset registers are zero. |
0b1 |
Virtualization of the Activity Monitors is enabled. |
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
Otherwise:
Otherwise:
Reserved, RES0.
TICAB, bit [50]
When FEAT_EVT is implemented:
When FEAT_EVT is implemented:
Trap ICIALLUIS/IC IALLUIS cache maintenance instructions. Traps execution of those cache maintenance instructions at EL1 to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state. This applies to the following instructions:
- When EL1 is using AArch64, IC IALLUIS.
- When EL1 is using AArch32, ICIALLUIS.
TICAB | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped. |
0b1 |
EL1 execution of the specified instructions is trapped to EL2. |
If the Point of Unification is before any level of instruction cache, it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether the execution of any instruction cache invalidate to the Point of Unification instruction can be trapped when the value of this control is 1.
When FEAT_VHE is implemented, and the value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, this field behaves as 0 for all purposes other than a direct read of the value of this bit.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
Otherwise:
Otherwise:
Reserved, RES0.
TID4, bit [49]
When FEAT_EVT is implemented:
When FEAT_EVT is implemented:
Trap ID group 4. Traps the following register accesses to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state:
AArch64:
- EL1 reads of CCSIDR_EL1, CCSIDR2_EL1, CLIDR_EL1, and CSSELR_EL1.
- EL1 writes to CSSELR_EL1.
AArch32:
TID4 | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped. |
0b1 |
The specified EL1 and EL0 accesses to ID group 4 registers are trapped to EL2. |
When FEAT_VHE is implemented, and the value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, this field behaves as 0 for all purposes other than a direct read of the value of this bit.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
Otherwise:
Otherwise:
Reserved, RES0.
Bit [48]
Reserved, RES0.
FIEN, bit [47]
When FEAT_RASv1p1 is implemented:
When FEAT_RASv1p1 is implemented:
Fault Injection Enable. Unless this bit is set to 1, accesses to the ERXPFGCDN_EL1, ERXPFGCTL_EL1, and ERXPFGF_EL1 registers from EL1 generate a Trap exception to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state, reported using EC syndrome value 0x18.
FIEN | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
Accesses to the specified registers from EL1 are trapped to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state. |
0b1 |
This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped. |
If EL2 is disabled in the current Security state, the Effective value of HCR_EL2.FIEN is 0b1.
If ERRIDR_EL1.NUM is zero, meaning no error records are implemented, or no error record accessible using System registers is owned by a node that implements the RAS Common Fault Injection Model Extension, then this bit might be RES0.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
Otherwise:
Otherwise:
Reserved, RES0.
FWB, bit [46]
When FEAT_S2FWB is implemented:
When FEAT_S2FWB is implemented:
Forced Write-Back. Defines the combined cacheability attributes in a 2 stage translation regime.
When FEAT_MTE2 is implemented, if the stage 1 page or block descriptor specifies the Tagged attribute, the final memory type is Tagged only if the final cacheable memory type is Inner and Outer Write-back cacheable and the final allocation hints are Read-Allocate, Write-Allocate.
FWB | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 | When this bit is 0, then:
|
0b1 | When this bit is 1, then:
The stage 1 and stage 2 memory types are combined in the manner described in 'Combining the stage 1 and stage 2 attributes, EL1&0 translation regime'. |
In Secure state, this bit applies to both the Secure stage 2 translation and the Non-secure stage 2 translation.
This bit is permitted to be cached in a TLB.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
Otherwise:
Otherwise:
Reserved, RES0.
NV2, bit [45]
When FEAT_NV2 is implemented:
When FEAT_NV2 is implemented:
Nested Virtualization. Changes the behaviors of HCR_EL2.{NV1, NV} to provide a mechanism for hardware to transform reads and writes from System registers into reads and writes from memory.
NV2 | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This bit has no effect on the behavior of HCR_EL2.{NV1, NV}. The behavior of HCR_EL2.{NV1, NV} is as defined for FEAT_NV. |
0b1 | Redefines behavior of HCR_EL2{NV1, NV} to enable:
Any exception taken from EL1 and taken to EL1 causes SPSR_EL1.M[3:2] to be set to 0b10 and not 0b01. |
When HCR_EL2.NV is 0, the Effective value of this field is 0.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
Otherwise:
Otherwise:
Reserved, RES0.
AT, bit [44]
When FEAT_NV is implemented:
When FEAT_NV is implemented:
Address Translation. EL1 execution of the following address translation instructions is trapped to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state, reported using EC syndrome value 0x18:
AT | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped. |
0b1 |
EL1 execution of the specified instructions is trapped to EL2. |
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
Otherwise:
Otherwise:
Reserved, RES0.
NV1, bit [43]
When FEAT_NV2 is implemented:
When FEAT_NV2 is implemented:
Nested Virtualization.
NV1 | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 | If HCR_EL2.{NV2, NV} are both 1, accesses executed from EL1 to implemented EL12, EL02, or EL2 registers are transformed to loads and stores. If HCR_EL2.NV2 is 0 or HCR_EL2.{NV2, NV} == {1, 0}, this control does not cause any instructions to be trapped. |
0b1 | If HCR_EL2.NV2 is 1, accesses executed from EL1 to implemented EL2 registers are transformed to loads and stores. If HCR_EL2.NV2 is 0, EL1 accesses to VBAR_EL1, ELR_EL1, SPSR_EL1, and, when FEAT_CSV2 is implemented, SCXTNUM_EL1, are trapped to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state, and are reported using EC syndrome value 0x18. |
If HCR_EL2.NV2 is 1, the value of HCR_EL2.NV1 defines which EL1 register accesses are transformed to loads and stores. These transformed accesses have priority over the trapping of registers.
The trapping of EL1 registers caused by other control bits has priority over the transformation of these accesses.
If a register is specified that is not implemented by an implementation, then access to that register are UNDEFINED.
For the list of registers affected, see 'Enhanced support for nested virtualization'.
If HCR_EL2.{NV1, NV} is {0, 1}, any exception taken from EL1, and taken to EL1, causes the SPSR_EL1.M[3:2] to be set to 0b10, and not 0b01.
If HCR_EL2.{NV1, NV} is {1, 1}, then:
- The EL1 translation table Block and Page descriptors:
- Bit[54] holds the PXN instead of the UXN.
- Bit[53] is RES0.
- Bit[6] is treated as 0 regardless of the actual value.
- If Hierarchical Permissions are enabled, the EL1 translation table Table descriptors are as follows:
- Bit[61] is treated as 0 regardless of the actual value.
- Bit[60] holds the PXNTable instead of the UXNTable.
- Bit[59] is RES0.
- When executing at EL1, the PSTATE.PAN bit is treated as zero for all purposes except reading the value of the bit.
- When executing at EL1, the LDTR* instructions are treated as the equivalent LDR* instructions, and the STTR* instructions are treated as the equivalent STR* instructions.
If HCR_EL2.{NV1, NV} are {1, 0}, then the behavior is a CONSTRAINED UNPREDICTABLE choice of:
- Behaving as if HCR_EL2.NV is 1 and HCR_EL2.NV1 is 1 for all purposes other than reading than reading back the value of the HCR_EL2.NV bit.
- Behaving as if HCR_EL2.NV is 0 and HCR_EL2.NV1 is 0 for all purposes other than reading than reading back the value of the HCR_EL2.NV1 bit.
- Behaving with regard to the HCR_EL2.NV and HCR_EL2.NV1 bits behavior as defined in the rest of this description.
This bit is permitted to be cached in a TLB.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
When FEAT_NV is implemented:
When FEAT_NV is implemented:
Nested Virtualization. EL1 accesses to certain registers are trapped to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state.
NV1 | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped. |
0b1 |
EL1 accesses to VBAR_EL1, ELR_EL1, SPSR_EL1, and, when FEAT_CSV2 is implemented, SCXTNUM_EL1, are trapped to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state, and are reported using EC syndrome value 0x18. |
If HCR_EL2.NV is 1 and HCR_EL2.NV1 is 0, then the following effects also apply:
- Any exception taken from EL1, and taken to EL1, causes the SPSR_EL1.M[3:2] to be set to 0b10, and not 0b01.
If HCR_EL2.NV and HCR_EL2.NV1 are both set to 1, then the following effects also apply:
- The EL1 translation table Block and Page descriptors:
- Bit[54] holds the PXN instead of the UXN.
- Bit[53] is RES0.
- Bit[6] is treated as 0 regardless of the actual value.
- If Hierarchical Permissions are enabled, the EL1 translation table Table descriptors are as follows:
- Bit[61] is treated as 0 regardless of the actual value.
- Bit[60] holds the PXNTable instead of the UXNTable.
- Bit[59] is RES0.
- When executing at EL1, the PSTATE.PAN bit is treated as zero for all purposes except reading the value of the bit.
- When executing at EL1, the LDTR* instructions are treated as the equivalent LDR* instructions, and the STTR* instructions are treated as the equivalent STR* instructions.
If HCR_EL2.NV is 0 and HCR_EL2.NV1 is 1, then the behavior is a CONSTRAINED UNPREDICTABLE choice of:
- Behaving as if HCR_EL2.NV is 1 and HCR_EL2.NV1 is 1 for all purposes other than reading than reading back the value of the HCR_EL2.NV bit.
- Behaving as if HCR_EL2.NV is 0 and HCR_EL2.NV1 is 0 for all purposes other than reading than reading back the value of the HCR_EL2.NV1 bit.
- Behaving with regard to the HCR_EL2.NV and HCR_EL2.NV1 bits behavior as defined in the rest of this description.
This bit is permitted to be cached in a TLB.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
Otherwise:
Otherwise:
Reserved, RES0.
NV, bit [42]
When FEAT_NV2 is implemented:
When FEAT_NV2 is implemented:
Nested Virtualization.
When HCR_EL2.NV2 is 1, redefines register accesses so that:
- Instructions accessing the Special purpose registers SPSR_EL2 and ELR_EL2 instead access SPSR_EL1 and ELR_EL1 respectively.
- Instructions accessing the System registers ESR_EL2 and FAR_EL2 instead access ESR_EL1 and FAR_EL1.
When HCR_EL2.NV2 is 0, or if FEAT_NV2 is not implemented, traps functionality that is permitted at EL2 and would be UNDEFINED at EL1 if this field was 0, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state. This applies to the following operations:
- EL1 accesses to Special-purpose registers that are not UNDEFINED at EL2.
- EL1 accesses to System registers that are not UNDEFINED at EL2.
- Execution of EL1 or EL2 translation regime address translation and TLB maintenance instructions for EL2 and above.
NV | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 | When this bit is set to 0, then the PE behaves as if HCR_EL2.NV2 is 0 for all purposes other than reading this register. This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped. When HCR_EL2.NV2 is 1, no FEAT_NV2 functionality is implemented. |
0b1 | When HCR_EL2.NV2 is 0, or if FEAT_NV2 is not implemented, EL1 accesses to the specified registers or the execution of the specified instructions are trapped to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state. EL1 read accesses to the CurrentEL register return a value of 0x2. When HCR_EL2.NV2 is 1, this control redefines EL1 register accesses so that instructions accessing SPSR_EL2, ELR_EL2, ESR_EL2, and FAR_EL2 instead access SPSR_EL1, ELR_EL1, ESR_EL1, and FAR_EL1 respectively. |
When HCR_EL2.NV2 is 0, or if FEAT_NV2 is not implemented, then:
- The System or Special-purpose registers for which accesses are trapped and reported using EC syndrome value 0x18 are as follows:
- Registers accessed using MRS or MSR with a name ending in _EL2, except SP_EL2.
- Registers accessed using MRS or MSR with a name ending in _EL12.
- Registers accessed using MRS or MSR with a name ending in _EL02.
- Special-purpose registers SPSR_irq, SPSR_abt, SPSR_und and SPSR_fiq, accessed using MRS or MSR.
- Special-purpose register SP_EL1 accessed using the dedicated MRS or MSR instruction.
- The instructions for which the execution is trapped and reported using EC syndrome value 0x18 are as follows:
- EL2 translation regime Address Translation instructions and TLB maintenance instructions.
- EL1 translation regime Address Translation instructions and TLB maintenance instructions that are accessible only from EL2 and EL3.
- The instructions for which the execution is trapped as follows:
- SMC in an implementation that does not include EL3 and when HCR_EL2.TSC is 1. HCR_EL2.TSC bit is not RES0 in this case. This is reported using EC syndrome value 0x17.
- The ERET, ERETAA, and ERETAB instructions, reported using EC syndrome value 0x1A.
The priority of this trap is higher than the priority of the HCR_EL2.API trap. If both of these bits are set so that EL1 execution of an ERETAA or ERETAB instruction is trapped to EL2, then the syndrome reported is 0x1A.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
When FEAT_NV is implemented:
When FEAT_NV is implemented:
Nested Virtualization. Traps functionality that is permitted at EL2 and would be UNDEFINED at EL1 if this field was 0, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state. This applies to the following operations:
- EL1 accesses to Special-purpose registers that are not UNDEFINED at EL2.
- EL1 accesses to System registers that are not UNDEFINED at EL2.
- Execution of EL1 or EL2 translation regime address translation and TLB maintenance instructions for EL2 and above.
The possible values are:
NV | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped. |
0b1 |
EL1 accesses to the specified registers or the execution of the specified instructions are trapped to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state. EL1 read accesses to the CurrentEL register return a value of 0x2. |
The System or Special-purpose registers for which accesses are trapped and reported using EC syndrome value 0x18 are as follows:
- Registers accessed using MRS or MSR with a name ending in _EL2, except SP_EL2.
- Registers accessed using MRS or MSR with a name ending in _EL12.
- Registers accessed using MRS or MSR with a name ending in _EL02.
- Special-purpose registers SPSR_irq, SPSR_abt, SPSR_und and SPSR_fiq, accessed using MRS or MSR.
- Special-purpose register SP_EL1 accessed using the dedicated MRS or MSR instruction.
The instructions for which the execution is trapped and reported using EC syndrome value 0x18 are as follows:
- EL2 translation regime Address Translation instructions and TLB maintenance instructions.
- EL1 translation regime Address Translation instructions and TLB maintenance instructions that are accessible only from EL2 and EL3.
The execution of the ERET, ERETAA, and ERETAB instructions are trapped and reported using EC syndrome value 0x1A
The priority of this trap is higher than the priority of the HCR_EL2.API trap. If both of these bits are set so that EL1 execution of an ERETAA or ERETAB instruction is trapped to EL2, then the syndrome reported is 0x1A.
The execution of the SMC instructions in an implementation that does not include EL3 and when HCR_EL2.TSC is 1 are trapped and reported using EC syndrome value 0x17. HCR_EL2.TSC bit is not RES0 in this case.
This bit is permitted to be cached in a TLB.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
Otherwise:
Otherwise:
Reserved, RES0.
API, bit [41]
When FEAT_PAuth is implemented:
When FEAT_PAuth is implemented:
Controls the use of instructions related to Pointer Authentication:
- In EL0, when HCR_EL2.TGE==0 or HCR_EL2.E2H==0, and the associated SCTLR_EL1.En<N><M>==1.
- In EL1, the associated SCTLR_EL1.En<N><M>==1.
Traps are reported using EC syndrome value 0x09. The Pointer Authentication instructions trapped are:
- AUTDA, AUTDB, AUTDZA, AUTDZB, AUTIA, AUTIA1716, AUTIASP, AUTIAZ, AUTIB, AUTIB1716, AUTIBSP, AUTIBZ, AUTIZA, AUTIZB.
- PACGA, PACDA, PACDB, PACDZA, PACDZB, PACIA, PACIA1716, PACIASP, PACIAZ, PACIB, PACIB1716, PACIBSP, PACIBZ, PACIZA, PACIZB.
- RETAA, RETAB, BRAA, BRAB, BLRAA, BLRAB, BRAAZ, BRABZ, BLRAAZ, BLRABZ.
- ERETAA, ERETAB, LDRAA and LDRAB.
API | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 | The instructions related to Pointer Authentication are trapped to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state and the instructions are enabled for the EL1&0 translation regime, from:
If HCR_EL2.NV is 1, the HCR_EL2.NV trap takes precedence over the HCR_EL2.API trap for the ERETAA and ERETAB instructions. If EL2 is implemented and enabled in the current Security state and HFGITR_EL2.ERET == 1, execution at EL1 using AArch64 of ERETAA or ERETAB instructions is reported with EC syndrome value 0x1A with its associated ISS field, as the fine-grained trap has higher priority than the HCR_EL2.API == 0. |
0b1 |
This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped. |
If FEAT_PAuth is implemented but EL2 is not implemented or disabled in the current Security state, the system behaves as if this bit is 1.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
Otherwise:
Otherwise:
Reserved, RES0.
APK, bit [40]
When FEAT_PAuth is implemented:
When FEAT_PAuth is implemented:
Trap registers holding "key" values for Pointer Authentication. Traps accesses to the following registers from EL1 to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state, reported using EC syndrome value 0x18:
- APIAKeyLo_EL1, APIAKeyHi_EL1, APIBKeyLo_EL1, APIBKeyHi_EL1, APDAKeyLo_EL1, APDAKeyHi_EL1, APDBKeyLo_EL1, APDBKeyHi_EL1, APGAKeyLo_EL1, and APGAKeyHi_EL1.
APK | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
Access to the registers holding "key" values for pointer authentication from EL1 are trapped to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state. |
0b1 |
This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped. |
If FEAT_PAuth is implemented but EL2 is not implemented or is disabled in the current Security state, the system behaves as if this bit is 1.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
Otherwise:
Otherwise:
Reserved, RES0.
Bit [39]
Reserved, RES0.
MIOCNCE, bit [38]
Mismatched Inner/Outer Cacheable Non-Coherency Enable, for the EL1&0 translation regimes.
MIOCNCE | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
For the EL1&0 translation regimes, for permitted accesses to a memory location that use a common definition of the Shareability and Cacheability of the location, there must be no loss of coherency if the Inner Cacheability attribute for those accesses differs from the Outer Cacheability attribute. |
0b1 |
For the EL1&0 translation regimes, for permitted accesses to a memory location that use a common definition of the Shareability and Cacheability of the location, there might be a loss of coherency if the Inner Cacheability attribute for those accesses differs from the Outer Cacheability attribute. |
For more information see 'Mismatched memory attributes'.
This field can be implemented as RAZ/WI.
When FEAT_VHE is implemented, and the value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, the PE ignores the value of this field for all purposes other than a direct read of this field.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
TEA, bit [37]
When FEAT_RAS is implemented:
When FEAT_RAS is implemented:
Route synchronous External abort exceptions to EL2.
TEA | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This control does not cause exceptions to be routed from EL0 and EL1 to EL2. |
0b1 |
Route synchronous External abort exceptions from EL0 and EL1 to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state, if not routed to EL3. |
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
Otherwise:
Otherwise:
Reserved, RES0.
TERR, bit [36]
When FEAT_RAS is implemented:
When FEAT_RAS is implemented:
Trap Error record accesses. Trap accesses to the RAS error registers from EL1 to EL2 as follows:
- If EL1 is using AArch64 state, accesses to the following registers are trapped to EL2, reported using EC syndrome value 0x18:
- ERRIDR_EL1, ERRSELR_EL1, ERXADDR_EL1, ERXCTLR_EL1, ERXFR_EL1, ERXMISC0_EL1, ERXMISC1_EL1, and ERXSTATUS_EL1.
- When FEAT_RASv1p1 is implemented, ERXMISC2_EL1, and ERXMISC3_EL1.
- If EL1 is using AArch32 state, MCR or MRC accesses are trapped to EL2, reported using EC syndrome value 0x03, MCRR or MRRC accesses are trapped to EL2, reported using EC syndrome value 0x04:
TERR | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped. |
0b1 |
Accesses to the specified registers from EL1 generate a Trap exception to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state. |
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
Otherwise:
Otherwise:
Reserved, RES0.
TLOR, bit [35]
When FEAT_LOR is implemented:
When FEAT_LOR is implemented:
Trap LOR registers. Traps Non-secure EL1 accesses to LORSA_EL1, LOREA_EL1, LORN_EL1, LORC_EL1, and LORID_EL1 registers to EL2.
TLOR | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped. |
0b1 |
Non-secure EL1 accesses to the LOR registers are trapped to EL2. |
When HCR_EL2.TGE is 1, the PE ignores the value of this field for all purposes other than a direct read of this field.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
Otherwise:
Otherwise:
Reserved, RES0.
E2H, bit [34]
When FEAT_VHE is implemented:
When FEAT_VHE is implemented:
EL2 Host. Enables a configuration where a Host Operating System is running in EL2, and the Host Operating System's applications are running in EL0.
E2H | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
The facilities to support a Host Operating System at EL2 are disabled. |
0b1 |
The facilities to support a Host Operating System at EL2 are enabled. |
For information on the behavior of this bit see 'Behavior of HCR_EL2.E2H'.
This bit is permitted to be cached in a TLB.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
Otherwise:
Otherwise:
Reserved, RES0.
ID, bit [33]
Stage 2 Instruction access cacheability disable. For the EL1&0 translation regime, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state and HCR_EL2.VM==1, this control forces all stage 2 translations for instruction accesses to Normal memory to be Non-cacheable.
ID | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This control has no effect on stage 2 of the EL1&0 translation regime. |
0b1 |
Forces all stage 2 translations for instruction accesses to Normal memory to be Non-cacheable. |
This bit has no effect on the EL2, EL2&0, or EL3 translation regimes.
When FEAT_VHE is implemented, and the value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, the PE ignores the value of this field for all purposes other than a direct read of this field.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
CD, bit [32]
Stage 2 Data access cacheability disable. For the EL1&0 translation regime, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state and HCR_EL2.VM==1, this control forces all stage 2 translations for data accesses and translation table walks to Normal memory to be Non-cacheable.
CD | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This control has no effect on stage 2 of the EL1&0 translation regime for data accesses and translation table walks. |
0b1 |
Forces all stage 2 translations for data accesses and translation table walks to Normal memory to be Non-cacheable. |
This bit has no effect on the EL2, EL2&0, or EL3 translation regimes.
When FEAT_VHE is implemented, and the value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, the PE ignores the value of this field for all purposes other than a direct read of this field.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
RW, bit [31]
When AArch32 is supported at any Exception level:
When AArch32 is supported at any Exception level:
Execution state control for lower Exception levels:
RW | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
Lower levels are all AArch32. |
0b1 |
The Execution state for EL1 is AArch64. The Execution state for EL0 is determined by the current value of PSTATE.nRW when executing at EL0. |
If AArch32 state is not supported by the implementation at EL1, then this bit is RAO/WI.
In an implementation that includes EL3, when EL2 is not enabled in Secure state, the PE behaves as if this bit has the same value as the SCR_EL3.RW bit for all purposes other than a direct read or write access of HCR_EL2.
The RW bit is permitted to be cached in a TLB.
When FEAT_VHE is implemented, and the value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, this field behaves as 1 for all purposes other than a direct read of the value of this bit.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
Otherwise:
Otherwise:
Reserved, RAO/WI.
TRVM, bit [30]
Trap Reads of Virtual Memory controls. Traps EL1 reads of the virtual memory control registers to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state, as follows:
-
If EL1 is using AArch64 state, the following registers are trapped to EL2 and reported using EC syndrome value 0x18.
-
If EL1 is using AArch32 state, accesses using MRC to the following registers are trapped to EL2 and reported using EC syndrome value 0x03, accesses using MRRC are trapped to EL2 and reported using EC syndrome value 0x04:
TRVM | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped. |
0b1 |
EL1 read accesses to the specified Virtual Memory controls are trapped to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state. |
When HCR_EL2.TGE is 1, the PE ignores the value of this field for all purposes other than a direct read of this field.
EL2 provides a second stage of address translation, that a hypervisor can use to remap the address map defined by a Guest OS. In addition, a hypervisor can trap attempts by a Guest OS to write to the registers that control the memory system. A hypervisor might use this trap as part of its virtualization of memory management.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
HCD, bit [29]
When EL3 is not implemented:
When EL3 is not implemented:
HVC instruction disable. Disables EL1 execution of HVC instructions, from both Execution states, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state, reported using EC syndrome value 0x00.
HCD | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
HVC instruction execution is enabled at EL2 and EL1. |
0b1 |
HVC instructions are UNDEFINED at EL2 and EL1. Any resulting exception is taken to the Exception level at which the HVC instruction is executed. |
HVC instructions are always UNDEFINED at EL0.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
Otherwise:
Otherwise:
Reserved, RES0.
TDZ, bit [28]
Trap DC ZVA instructions. Traps EL0 and EL1 execution of DC ZVA instructions to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state, from AArch64 state only, reported using EC syndrome value 0x18.
If FEAT_MTE2 is implemented, this trap also applies to DC GVA and DC GZVA.
TDZ | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped. |
0b1 | In AArch64 state, any attempt to execute an instruction this trap applies to at EL1, or at EL0 when the instruction is not UNDEFINED at EL0, is trapped to EL2 when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state. Reading the DCZID_EL0 returns a value that indicates that the instructions this trap applies to are not supported. |
When FEAT_VHE is implemented, and the value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, this field behaves as 0 for all purposes other than a direct read of the value of this bit.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
TGE, bit [27]
Trap General Exceptions, from EL0.
TGE | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This control has no effect on execution at EL0. |
0b1 | When EL2 is not enabled in the current Security state, this control has no effect on execution at EL0. When EL2 is enabled in the current Security state, in all cases:
In addition, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state, if:
For further information on the behavior of this bit when E2H is 1, see 'Behavior of HCR_EL2.E2H'. |
HCR_EL2.TGE must not be cached in a TLB.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
TVM, bit [26]
Trap Virtual Memory controls. Traps EL1 writes to the virtual memory control registers to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state, as follows:
-
If EL1 is using AArch64 state, the following registers are trapped to EL2 and reported using EC syndrome value 0x18:
-
If EL1 is using AArch32 state, accesses using MCR to the following registers are trapped to EL2 and reported using EC syndrome value 0x03, accesses using MCRR are trapped to EL2 and reported using EC syndrome value 0x04:
TVM | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped. |
0b1 |
EL1 write accesses to the specified EL1 virtual memory control registers are trapped to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state. |
When HCR_EL2.TGE is 1, the PE ignores the value of this field for all purposes other than a direct read of this field.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
TTLB, bit [25]
Trap TLB maintenance instructions. Traps EL1 execution of TLB maintenance instructions to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state, as follows:
-
When EL1 is using AArch64 state, the following instructions are trapped to EL2 and reported using EC syndrome value 0x18:
- TLBI VMALLE1, TLBI VAE1, TLBI ASIDE1, TLBI VAAE1, TLBI VALE1, TLBI VAALE1.
- TLBI VMALLE1IS, TLBI VAE1IS, TLBI ASIDE1IS, TLBI VAAE1IS, TLBI VALE1IS, TLBI VAALE1IS.
- If FEAT_TLBIOS is implemented, this trap applies to TLBI VMALLE1OS, TLBI VAE1OS, TLBI ASIDE1OS, TLBI VAAE1OS, TLBI VALE1OS, TLBI VAALE1OS.
- If FEAT_TLBIRANGE is implemented, this trap applies to TLBI RVAE1, TLBI RVAAE1, TLBI RVALE1, TLBI RVAALE1, TLBI RVAE1IS, TLBI RVAAE1IS, TLBI RVALE1IS, TLBI RVAALE1IS.
- If FEAT_TLBIOS and FEAT_TLBIRANGE are implemented, this trap appplies to TLBI RVAE1OS, TLBI RVAAE1OS, TLBI RVALE1OS, TLBI RVAALE1OS.
-
When EL1 is using AArch32 state, the following instructions are trapped to EL2 and reported using EC syndrome value 0x03:
TTLB | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped. |
0b1 |
EL1 execution of the specified TLB maintenance instructions are trapped to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state. |
When HCR_EL2.TGE is 1, the PE ignores the value of this field for all purposes other than a direct read of this field.
The TLB maintenance instructions are UNDEFINED at EL0.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
TPU, bit [24]
Trap cache maintenance instructions that operate to the Point of Unification. Traps execution of those cache maintenance instructions to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state as follows:
- If EL0 is using AArch64 state and the value of SCTLR_EL1.UCI is not 0, the following instructions are trapped to EL2 and reported with EC syndrome value 0x18:
- If EL1 is using AArch64 state, the following instructions are trapped to EL2 and reported with EC syndrome value 0x18:
- If EL1 is using AArch32 state, the following instructions are trapped to EL2 and reported with EC syndrome value 0x18:
An exception generated because an instruction is UNDEFINED at EL0 is higher priority than this trap to EL2. In addition:
TPU | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped. |
0b1 |
Execution of the specified instructions is trapped to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state. |
If the Point of Unification is before any level of data cache, it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether the execution of any data or unified cache clean by VA to the Point of Unification instruction can be trapped when the value of this control is 1.
If the Point of Unification is before any level of instruction cache, it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether the execution of any instruction cache invalidate to the Point of Unification instruction can be trapped when the value of this control is 1.
When FEAT_VHE is implemented, and the value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, this field behaves as 0 for all purposes other than a direct read of the value of this bit.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
TPCP, bit [23]
When FEAT_DPB is implemented:
When FEAT_DPB is implemented:
Trap data or unified cache maintenance instructions that operate to the Point of Coherency or Persistence. Traps execution of those cache maintenance instructions to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state as follows:
- If EL0 is using AArch64 state and the value of SCTLR_EL1.UCI is not 0, the following instructions are trapped to EL2 and reported using EC syndrome value 0x18:
- If EL1 is using AArch64 state, the following instructions are trapped to EL2 and reported using EC syndrome value 0x18:
- If EL1 is using AArch32 state, the following instructions are trapped to EL2 and reported using EC syndrome value 0x03:
If FEAT_DPB2 is implemented, this trap also applies to DC CVADP.
If FEAT_MTE2 is implemented, this trap also applies to DC CIGVAC, DC CIGDVAC, DC IGVAC, DC IGDVAC, DC CGVAC, DC CGDVAC, DC CGVAP and DC CGDVAP.
If FEAT_DPB2 and FEAT_MTE2 are implemented, this trap also applies to DC CGVADP and DC CGDVADP.
- An exception generated because an instruction is UNDEFINED at EL0 is higher priority than this trap to EL2. In addition:
- In Armv8.0 and Armv8.1, this field is named TPC. From Armv8.2 it is named TPCP.
TPCP | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped. |
0b1 |
Execution of the specified instructions is trapped to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state. |
If the Point of Coherency is before any level of data cache, it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether the execution of any data or unified cache clean, invalidate, or clean and invalidate instruction that operates by VA to the point of coherency can be trapped when the value of this control is 1.
If HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is set to {1, 1}, this field behaves as 0 for all purposes other than a direct read of the value of this bit.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
Otherwise:
Otherwise:
Trap data or unified cache maintenance instructions that operate to the Point of Coherency. Traps execution of those cache maintenance instructions to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state as follows:
- If EL0 is using AArch64 state and the value of SCTLR_EL1.UCI is not 0, accesses to the following registers are trapped and reported using EC syndrome value 0x18:
- If EL1 is using AArch64 state, accesses to DC IVAC, DC CIVAC, DC CVAC are trapped and reported using EC syndrome value 0x18.
- When EL1 is using AArch32, accesses to DCIMVAC, DCCIMVAC, and DCCMVAC are trapped and reported using EC syndrome value 0x03.
- An exception generated because an instruction is UNDEFINED at EL0 is higher priority than this trap to EL2. In addition:
- In Armv8.0 and Armv8.1, this field is named TPC. From Armv8.2 it is named TPCP.
TPC | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped. |
0b1 |
Execution of the specified instructions is trapped to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state. |
If the Point of Coherency is before any level of data cache, it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether the execution of any data or unified cache clean, invalidate, or clean and invalidate instruction that operates by VA to the point of coherency can be trapped when the value of this control is 1.
When FEAT_VHE is implemented, and the value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, this field behaves as 0 for all purposes other than a direct read of the value of this bit.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
TSW, bit [22]
Trap data or unified cache maintenance instructions that operate by Set/Way. Traps execution of those cache maintenance instructions at EL1 to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state as follows:
- If EL1 is using AArch64 state, accesses to DC ISW, DC CSW, DC CISW are trapped to EL2, reported using EC syndrome value 0x18.
- If EL1 is using AArch32 state, accesses to DCISW, DCCSW, DCCISW are trapped to EL2, reported using EC syndrome value 0x03.
If FEAT_MTE2 is implemented, this trap also applies to DC IGSW, DC IGDSW, DC CGSW, DC CGDW, DC CIGSW, and DC CIGDSW.
An exception generated because an instruction is UNDEFINED at EL0 is higher priority than this trap to EL2, and these instructions are always UNDEFINED at EL0.
TSW | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped. |
0b1 |
Execution of the specified instructions is trapped to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state. |
When HCR_EL2.TGE is 1, the PE ignores the value of this field for all purposes other than a direct read of this field.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
TACR, bit [21]
Trap Auxiliary Control Registers. Traps EL1 accesses to the Auxiliary Control Registers to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state, as follows:
- If EL1 is using AArch64 state, accesses to ACTLR_EL1 to EL2, are trapped to EL2 and reported using EC syndrome value 0x18.
- If EL1 is using AArch32 state, accesses to ACTLR and, if implemented, ACTLR2 are trapped to EL2 and reported using EC syndrome value 0x03.
TACR | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped. |
0b1 |
EL1 accesses to the specified registers are trapped to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state. |
When HCR_EL2.TGE is 1, the PE ignores the value of this field for all purposes other than a direct read of this field.
ACTLR_EL1 is not accessible at EL0
ACTLR, and ACTLR2 are not accessible at EL0.
The Auxiliary Control Registers are IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED registers that might implement global control bits for the PE.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
TIDCP, bit [20]
Trap IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED functionality. Traps EL1 accesses to the encodings reserved for IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED functionality to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state as follows:
- In AArch64 state, access to any of the encodings in the following reserved encoding spaces are trapped and reported using EC syndrome 0x18:
- IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED System instructions, which are accessed using SYS and SYSL, with CRn == {11, 15}.
- IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED System registers, which are accessed using MRS and MSR with the S3_<op1>_<Cn>_<Cm>_<op2> register name.
- In AArch32 state, MCR and MRC access to instructions with the following encodings are trapped and reported using EC syndrome 0x03:
- All coproc==p15, CRn==c9, opc1 == {0-7}, CRm == {c0-c2, c5-c8}, opc2 == {0-7}.
- All coproc==p15, CRn==c10, opc1 =={0-7}, CRm == {c0, c1, c4, c8}, opc2 == {0-7}.
- All coproc==p15, CRn==c11, opc1=={0-7}, CRm == {c0-c8, c15}, opc2 == {0-7}.
When the value of HCR_EL2.TIDCP is 1, it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether any of this functionality accessed from EL0 is trapped to EL2. If it is not, then it is UNDEFINED, and any attempt to access it from EL0 generates an exception that is taken to EL1.
TIDCP | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped. |
0b1 |
EL1 accesses to or execution of the specified encodings reserved for IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED functionality are trapped to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state. |
An implementation can also include IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED registers that provide additional controls, to give finer-grained control of the trapping of IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED features.
Arm expects the trapping of EL0 accesses to these functions to EL2 to be unusual, and used only when the hypervisor is virtualizing EL0 operation. Arm strongly recommends that unless the hypervisor must virtualize EL0 operation, an EL0 access to any of these functions is UNDEFINED, as it would be if the implementation did not include EL2. The PE then takes any resulting exception to EL1.
The trapping of accesses to these registers from EL1 is higher priority than an exception resulting from the register access being UNDEFINED.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
TSC, bit [19]
Trap SMC instructions. Traps EL1 execution of SMC instructions to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state.
If execution is in AArch64 state, the trap is reported using EC syndrome value 0x17.
If execution is in AArch32 state, the trap is reported using EC syndrome value 0x13.
HCR_EL2.TSC traps execution of the SMC instruction. It is not a routing control for the SMC exception. Trap exceptions and SMC exceptions have different preferred return addresses.
TSC | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped. |
0b1 | If EL3 is implemented, then any attempt to execute an SMC instruction at EL1 is trapped to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state, regardless of the value of SCR_EL3.SMD. If EL3 is not implemented, FEAT_NV is implemented, and HCR_EL2.NV is 1, then any attempt to execute an SMC instruction at EL1 using AArch64 is trapped to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state. If EL3 is not implemented, and either FEAT_NV is not implemented or HCR_EL2.NV is 0, then it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether:
|
In AArch32 state, the Armv8-A architecture permits, but does not require, this trap to apply to conditional SMC instructions that fail their condition code check, in the same way as with traps on other conditional instructions.
SMC instructions are UNDEFINED at EL0.
If EL3 is not implemented and HCR_EL2.NV is 0, it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether this bit is:
- RES0.
- Implemented with the functionality as described in HCR_EL2.TSC.
When HCR_EL2.TGE is 1, the PE ignores the value of this field for all purposes other than a direct read of this field.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
TID3, bit [18]
Trap ID group 3. Traps EL1 reads of group 3 ID registers to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state, as follows:
In AArch64 state:
-
Reads of the following registers are trapped to EL2, reported using EC syndrome value 0x18:
-
ID_PFR0_EL1, ID_PFR1_EL1, ID_PFR2_EL1, ID_DFR0_EL1, ID_AFR0_EL1, ID_MMFR0_EL1, ID_MMFR1_EL1, ID_MMFR2_EL1, ID_MMFR3_EL1, ID_ISAR0_EL1, ID_ISAR1_EL1, ID_ISAR2_EL1, ID_ISAR3_EL1, ID_ISAR4_EL1, ID_ISAR5_EL1, MVFR0_EL1, MVFR1_EL1, MVFR2_EL1.
-
ID_AA64PFR0_EL1, ID_AA64PFR1_EL1, ID_AA64DFR0_EL1, ID_AA64DFR1_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1, ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1, ID_AA64AFR0_EL1, ID_AA64AFR1_EL1.
-
If FEAT_FGT is implemented:
-
ID_MMFR4_EL1 and ID_MMFR5_EL1 are trapped to EL2.
-
ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1 and ID_ISAR6_EL1 are trapped to EL2.
-
ID_DFR1_EL1 is trapped to EL2.
-
ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1 is trapped to EL2.
-
ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1 is trapped to EL2.
-
This field traps all MRS accesses to registers in the following range that are not already mentioned in this field description: Op0 == 3, op1 == 0, CRn == c0, CRm == {c1-c7}, op2 == {0-7}.
-
-
If FEAT_FGT is not implemented:
-
ID_MMFR4_EL1 and ID_MMFR5_EL1 are trapped to EL2, unless implemented as RAZ, when it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether accesses to ID_MMFR4_EL1 or ID_MMFR5_EL1 are trapped to EL2.
-
ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1 and ID_ISAR6_EL1 are trapped to EL2, unless implemented as RAZ, when it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether accesses to ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1 or ID_ISAR6_EL1 are trapped to EL2.
-
ID_DFR1_EL1 is trapped to EL2, unless implemented as RAZ, when it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether accesses to ID_DFR1_EL1 are trapped to EL2.
-
ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1 is trapped to EL2, unless implemented as RAZ then it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether accesses to ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1 are trapped to EL2.
-
ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1 is trapped to EL2, unless implemented as RAZ then it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether accesses to ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1 are trapped to EL2.
-
Otherwise, it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether this bit traps MRS accesses to registers in the following range that are not already mentioned in this field description: Op0 == 3, op1 == 0, CRn == c0, CRm == {c1-c7}, op2 == {0-7}.
-
-
In AArch32 state:
-
VMRS access to MVFR0, MVFR1, and MVFR2, are trapped to EL2, reported using EC syndrome value 0x08, unless access is also trapped by HCPTR which takes priority.
-
MRC access to the following registers are trapped to EL2, reported using EC syndrome value 0x03:
-
ID_PFR0, ID_PFR1, ID_PFR2, ID_DFR0, ID_AFR0, ID_MMFR0, ID_MMFR1, ID_MMFR2, ID_MMFR3, ID_ISAR0, ID_ISAR1, ID_ISAR2, ID_ISAR3, ID_ISAR4, ID_ISAR5.
-
If FEAT_FGT is implemented:
-
If FEAT_FGT is not implemented:
-
ID_MMFR4 and ID_MMFR5 are trapped to EL2, unless implemented as RAZ, when it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether accesses to ID_MMFR4 or ID_MMFR5 are trapped.
-
ID_ISAR6 is trapped to EL2, unless implemented as RAZ, when it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether accesses to ID_ISAR6 are trapped to EL2.
-
ID_DFR1 is trapped to EL2, unless implemented as RAZ, when it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether accesses to ID_DFR1 are trapped to EL2.
-
Otherwise, it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether this bit traps all MRC accesses to registers in the following range not already mentioned in this field description with coproc == p15, opc1 == 0, CRn == c0, CRm == {c2-c7}, opc2 == {0-7}.
-
-
TID3 | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped. |
0b1 |
The specified EL1 read accesses to ID group 3 registers are trapped to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state. |
When HCR_EL2.TGE is 1, the PE ignores the value of this field for all purposes other than a direct read of this field.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
TID2, bit [17]
Trap ID group 2. Traps the following register accesses to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state, as follows:
- If EL1 is using AArch64, reads of CTR_EL0, CCSIDR_EL1, CCSIDR2_EL1, CLIDR_EL1, and CSSELR_EL1 are trapped to EL2, reported using EC syndrome value 0x18.
- If EL0 is using AArch64 and the value of SCTLR_EL1.UCT is not 0, reads of CTR_EL0 are trapped to EL2, reported using EC syndrome value 0x18. If the value of SCTLR_EL1.UCT is 0 then EL0 reads of CTR_EL0 are UNDEFINED and any resulting exception takes precedence over this trap.
- If EL1 is using AArch64, writes to CSSELR_EL1 are trapped to EL2, reported using EC syndrome value 0x18.
- If EL1 is using AArch32, reads of CTR, CCSIDR, CCSIDR2, CLIDR, and CSSELR are trapped to EL2, reported using EC syndrome value 0x03.
- If EL1 is using AArch32, writes to CSSELR are trapped to EL2, reported using EC syndrome value 0x03.
TID2 | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped. |
0b1 |
The specified EL1 and EL0 accesses to ID group 2 registers are trapped to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state. |
When FEAT_VHE is implemented, and the value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, this field behaves as 0 for all purposes other than a direct read of the value of this bit.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
TID1, bit [16]
Trap ID group 1. Traps EL1 reads of the following registers to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state as follows:
-
In AArch64 state, accesses of REVIDR_EL1, AIDR_EL1, reported using EC syndrome value 0x18.
-
In AArch32 state, accesses of TCMTR, TLBTR, REVIDR, AIDR, reported using EC syndrome value 0x03.
TID1 | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped. |
0b1 |
The specified EL1 read accesses to ID group 1 registers are trapped to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state. |
When HCR_EL2.TGE is 1, the PE ignores the value of this field for all purposes other than a direct read of this field.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
TID0, bit [15]
When AArch32 is supported at any Exception level:
When AArch32 is supported at any Exception level:
Trap ID group 0. Traps the following register accesses to EL2:
- EL1 reads of the JIDR, reported using EC syndrome value 0x05.
- If the JIDR is RAZ from EL0, EL0 reads of the JIDR, reported using EC syndrome value 0x05.
- EL1 accesses using VMRS of the FPSID, reported using EC syndrome value 0x08.
TID0 | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped. |
0b1 |
The specified EL1 read accesses to ID group 0 registers are trapped to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state. |
When FEAT_VHE is implemented, and the value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, this field behaves as 0 for all purposes other than a direct read of the value of this bit.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
Otherwise:
Otherwise:
Reserved, RES0.
TWE, bit [14]
Traps EL0 and EL1 execution of WFE instructions to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state, from both Execution states, reported using EC syndrome value 0x01.
When FEAT_WFxT is implemented, this trap also applies to the WFET instruction.
TWE | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped. |
0b1 |
Any attempt to execute a WFE instruction at EL0 or EL1 is trapped to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state, if the instruction would otherwise have caused the PE to enter a low-power state and it is not trapped by SCTLR.nTWE or SCTLR_EL1.nTWE. |
In AArch32 state, the attempted execution of a conditional WFE instruction is trapped only if the instruction passes its condition code check.
Since a WFE can complete at any time, even without a Wakeup event, the traps on WFE are not guaranteed to be taken, even if the WFE is executed when there is no Wakeup event. The only guarantee is that if the instruction does not complete in finite time in the absence of a Wakeup event, the trap will be taken.
When FEAT_VHE is implemented, and the value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, this field behaves as 0 for all purposes other than a direct read of the value of this bit.
For more information about when WFE instructions can cause the PE to enter a low-power state, see 'Wait for Event mechanism and Send event'.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
TWI, bit [13]
Traps EL0 and EL1 execution of WFI instructions to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state, from both Execution states, reported using EC syndrome value 0x01.
When FEAT_WFxT is implemented, this trap also applies to the WFIT instruction.
TWI | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This control does not cause any instructions to be trapped. |
0b1 |
Any attempt to execute a WFI instruction at EL0 or EL1 is trapped to EL2, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state, if the instruction would otherwise have caused the PE to enter a low-power state and it is not trapped by SCTLR.nTWI or SCTLR_EL1.nTWI. |
In AArch32 state, the attempted execution of a conditional WFI instruction is trapped only if the instruction passes its condition code check.
Since a WFI can complete at any time, even without a Wakeup event, the traps on WFI are not guaranteed to be taken, even if the WFI is executed when there is no Wakeup event. The only guarantee is that if the instruction does not complete in finite time in the absence of a Wakeup event, the trap will be taken.
When FEAT_VHE is implemented, and the value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, this field behaves as 0 for all purposes other than a direct read of the value of this bit.
For more information about when WFI instructions can cause the PE to enter a low-power state, see 'Wait for Interrupt'.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
DC, bit [12]
Default Cacheability.
DC | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This control has no effect on the EL1&0 translation regime. |
0b1 | In both Security states:
|
This field has no effect on the EL2, EL2&0, and EL3 translation regimes.
This field is permitted to be cached in a TLB.
When FEAT_VHE is implemented, and the value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, this field behaves as 0 for all purposes other than a direct read of the value of this field.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
BSU, bits [11:10]
Barrier Shareability upgrade. This field determines the minimum shareability domain that is applied to any barrier instruction executed from EL1 or EL0:
BSU | Meaning |
---|---|
0b00 |
No effect. |
0b01 |
Inner Shareable. |
0b10 |
Outer Shareable. |
0b11 |
Full system. |
This value is combined with the specified level of the barrier held in its instruction, using the same principles as combining the shareability attributes from two stages of address translation.
When FEAT_VHE is implemented, and the value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, this field behaves as 0b00 for all purposes other than a direct read of the value of this bit.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
FB, bit [9]
Force broadcast. Causes the following instructions to be broadcast within the Inner Shareable domain when executed from EL1:
AArch32: BPIALL, TLBIALL, TLBIMVA, TLBIASID, DTLBIALL, DTLBIMVA, DTLBIASID, ITLBIALL, ITLBIMVA, ITLBIASID, TLBIMVAA, ICIALLU, TLBIMVAL, TLBIMVAAL.
AArch64: TLBI VMALLE1, TLBI VAE1, TLBI ASIDE1, TLBI VAAE1, TLBI VALE1, TLBI VAALE1, IC IALLU, TLBI RVAE1, TLBI RVAAE1, TLBI RVALE1, TLBI RVAALE1.
FB | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This field has no effect on the operation of the specified instructions. |
0b1 |
When one of the specified instruction is executed at EL1, the instruction is broadcast within the Inner Shareable shareability domain. |
When HCR_EL2.TGE is 1, the PE ignores the value of this field for all purposes other than a direct read of this field.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
VSE, bit [8]
Virtual SError interrupt.
VSE | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This mechanism is not making a virtual SError interrupt pending. |
0b1 |
A virtual SError interrupt is pending because of this mechanism. |
The virtual SError interrupt is enabled only when the value of HCR_EL2.{TGE, AMO} is {0, 1}.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
VI, bit [7]
Virtual IRQ Interrupt.
VI | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This mechanism is not making a virtual IRQ pending. |
0b1 |
A virtual IRQ is pending because of this mechanism. |
The virtual IRQ is enabled only when the value of HCR_EL2.{TGE, IMO} is {0, 1}.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
VF, bit [6]
Virtual FIQ Interrupt.
VF | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This mechanism is not making a virtual FIQ pending. |
0b1 |
A virtual FIQ is pending because of this mechanism. |
The virtual FIQ is enabled only when the value of HCR_EL2.{TGE, FMO} is {0, 1}.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
AMO, bit [5]
Physical SError interrupt routing.
AMO | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 | When executing at Exception levels below EL2, and EL2 is enabled in the current Security state: |
0b1 | When executing at any Exception level, and EL2 is enabled in the current Security state:
|
If EL2 is enabled in the current Security state and the value of HCR_EL2.TGE is 1:
- Regardless of the value of the AMO bit physical asynchronous External aborts and SError interrupts target EL2 unless they are routed to EL3.
- When FEAT_VHE is not implemented, or if HCR_EL2.E2H is 0, this field behaves as 1 for all purposes other than a direct read of the value of this bit.
- When FEAT_VHE is implemented and HCR_EL2.E2H is 1, this field behaves as 0 for all purposes other than a direct read of the value of this bit.
For more information, see 'Asynchronous exception routing'.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
IMO, bit [4]
Physical IRQ Routing.
IMO | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 | When executing at Exception levels below EL2, and EL2 is enabled in the current Security state: |
0b1 | When executing at any Exception level, and EL2 is enabled in the current Security state:
|
If EL2 is enabled in the current Security state, and the value of HCR_EL2.TGE is 1:
- Regardless of the value of the IMO bit, physical IRQ Interrupts target EL2 unless they are routed to EL3.
- When FEAT_VHE is not implemented, or if HCR_EL2.E2H is 0, this field behaves as 1 for all purposes other than a direct read of the value of this bit.
- When FEAT_VHE is implemented and HCR_EL2.E2H is 1, this field behaves as 0 for all purposes other than a direct read of the value of this bit.
For more information, see 'Asynchronous exception routing'.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
FMO, bit [3]
Physical FIQ Routing.
FMO | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 | When executing at Exception levels below EL2, and EL2 is enabled in the current Security state: |
0b1 | When executing at any Exception level, and EL2 is enabled in the current Security state:
|
If EL2 is enabled in the current Security state and the value of HCR_EL2.TGE is 1:
- Regardless of the value of the FMO bit, physical FIQ Interrupts target EL2 unless they are routed to EL3.
- When FEAT_VHE is not implemented, or if HCR_EL2.E2H is 0, this field behaves as 1 for all purposes other than a direct read of the value of this bit.
- When FEAT_VHE is implemented and HCR_EL2.E2H is 1, this field behaves as 0 for all purposes other than a direct read of the value of this bit.
For more information, see 'Asynchronous exception routing'.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
PTW, bit [2]
Protected Table Walk. In the EL1&0 translation regime, a translation table access made as part of a stage 1 translation table walk is subject to a stage 2 translation. The combining of the memory type attributes from the two stages of translation means the access might be made to a type of Device memory. If this occurs, then the value of this bit determines the behavior:
PTW | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
The translation table walk occurs as if it is to Normal Non-cacheable memory. This means it can be made speculatively. |
0b1 |
The memory access generates a stage 2 Permission fault. |
This field is permitted to be cached in a TLB.
When HCR_EL2.TGE is 1, the PE ignores the value of this field for all purposes other than a direct read of this field.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
SWIO, bit [1]
Set/Way Invalidation Override. Causes EL1 execution of the data cache invalidate by set/way instructions to perform a data cache clean and invalidate by set/way:
SWIO | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
This control has no effect on the operation of data cache invalidate by set/way instructions. |
0b1 |
Data cache invalidate by set/way instructions perform a data cache clean and invalidate by set/way. |
When the value of this bit is 1:
AArch32: DCISW performs the same invalidation as a DCCISW instruction.
AArch64: DC ISW performs the same invalidation as a DC CISW instruction.
This bit can be implemented as RES1.
When HCR_EL2.TGE is 1, the PE ignores the value of this field for all purposes other than a direct read of this field.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
VM, bit [0]
Virtualization enable. Enables stage 2 address translation for the EL1&0 translation regime, when EL2 is enabled in the current Security state.
VM | Meaning |
---|---|
0b0 |
EL1&0 stage 2 address translation disabled. |
0b1 |
EL1&0 stage 2 address translation enabled. |
When the value of this bit is 1, data cache invalidate instructions executed at EL1 perform a data cache clean and invalidate. For the invalidate by set/way instruction this behavior applies regardless of the value of the HCR_EL2.SWIO bit.
This bit is permitted to be cached in a TLB.
When FEAT_VHE is implemented, and the value of HCR_EL2.{E2H, TGE} is {1, 1}, this field behaves as 0 for all purposes other than a direct read of the value of this bit.
On a Warm reset, this field resets to an architecturally UNKNOWN value.
Accessing the HCR_EL2
Accesses to this register use the following encodings:
MRS <Xt>, HCR_EL2
op0 | op1 | CRn | CRm | op2 |
---|---|---|---|---|
0b11 | 0b100 | 0b0001 | 0b0001 | 0b000 |
if PSTATE.EL == EL0 then UNDEFINED; elsif PSTATE.EL == EL1 then if EL2Enabled() && HCR_EL2.<NV2,NV> == '11' then return NVMem[0x078]; elsif EL2Enabled() && HCR_EL2.NV == '1' then AArch64.SystemAccessTrap(EL2, 0x18); else UNDEFINED; elsif PSTATE.EL == EL2 then return HCR_EL2; elsif PSTATE.EL == EL3 then return HCR_EL2;
MSR HCR_EL2, <Xt>
op0 | op1 | CRn | CRm | op2 |
---|---|---|---|---|
0b11 | 0b100 | 0b0001 | 0b0001 | 0b000 |
if PSTATE.EL == EL0 then UNDEFINED; elsif PSTATE.EL == EL1 then if EL2Enabled() && HCR_EL2.<NV2,NV> == '11' then NVMem[0x078] = X[t]; elsif EL2Enabled() && HCR_EL2.NV == '1' then AArch64.SystemAccessTrap(EL2, 0x18); else UNDEFINED; elsif PSTATE.EL == EL2 then HCR_EL2 = X[t]; elsif PSTATE.EL == EL3 then HCR_EL2 = X[t];